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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
J\JAHGARET McALLISTER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

- vs -

LA1IAR BYBEE, CARVEL MATTRNON, Administrator of the Estate of
()'DP 11
·wa ts on, Deceased, C AL I FORNIA-PACIFIC UTILITIES COMPANY, a corporation, and KANAB
Cf'l 1 Y, UTAH, a municipal corporation,

Case No.

10726

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIJ~F OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
CALfFORNIA PACIFIC UTILITIES COMPANY,

a corporation

NATURE OF THE CASE
'l'his is an action fo.r damages for personal injuries
alh•gpd]y sustained by plaintiff when, after alighting
from a ear at the curb, she fell as she was attempting
to walk from the curb to the public side·walk on the
main street of Kanab, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
Tlie trial court dismissed the action as against all
fli'f'f•ndants at the close of plaintiff's evidence and, after
)i,.I' motion for new trial was denied, plaintiff appealed.
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STATEJ\fI;jNT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is incom1>letp and
it is not supported by citations to tlw pages of tltp rrcord, as required by Rule 75 (p) (2), Utah Rules of CiYil
Procedure. Therefore, respondent California-Pacific
Utilities Company, herein called for convenience "Pacific," sets forth the following statement of the

faet~,

with supporting citations to the numbered pagrs of tlt1·
transcript of testimony.
Plaintiff claimed she sustained injuries in a fall
which occu.rrPd in Kanab, rtah, on the morning of
September lh, 1963, just after she alighted from tlw
passenger side of her car, parked paralle>l to the curL,
and began to walk across the area between the curh and
the public sidewalk toward the bank when' she inten<led
to make a deposit. The car was facing Wf'st, on tlw
north sidf' o.f the street, and in front of property ownr1l
by respondents Byhef' and Watson (Ex. A, Tr. 31, 3~).
'rhe hank building was east of the ear, so that appellant was inknding to walk in a nortlwast clirPctiou.
Between thP Bybf'e-\Vatson property and the strf'rt then·
was a public sidt>walk, a wide curbing or parking strip
and the eurh and guttr>r, all of which was 1mhlic propPrty, own<'d h>· i·pspond<>nt Kanah Cit>- (Tr. 139).
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'l'here was a building, immediately north o.f the sidewalk, which had been leased by Bybee and Watson to
Pacific, and which is described in the record as the
''light company office" (Ex. 7, Tr. 31). East of this
hnilding, and between it and the bank, was a 14-foot
vacant lot, also owned by Bybee and Watson (Tr. 146).
When Bybee and 1N atson acquired their property in
10:55, there was a canopy extending from the south side
of thP building, out over the sidewalk to the street line.
A srrvice station business had formerly been conducted
in the building and there had been gasoline pumps under
the canopy (Tr. 139). The canopy had been supported
hy pillars, resting on concrete blocks about 18 inches
o;quare. ..When the street was widened, the authorities
required the building owners, Bybee and ·watson, to remow the canopy and pillars. They did so, leaving the
<.'nncrete bases intact, near the curb. These are the connete blocks, which were six or eight inches high, and
1vhich are mentioned throughout the record (Tr. 143,
1+-t, 151 ).
Then• was a small pipe, projecting slightly above
tl1C' ground, just east of the easternmost cement block.
Thi,; pipe, d<'Scribed as a water pipe, apparently had
lH•pn u~ed in the service station business. It was in place

]lrior to tlte time the building was leased to Pacific and,
likP tlw cement block, was surrounded by public land

011rn·d 11;: thP City of Kanab (Tr. 1-15, 14-6).
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Appellant had worked for 16 years in a cafe Jia"l"l
onally across the street from the point where this inC'Jdent occurred. She had seen the cement block many times
as she passed hy, walking to work. She had good f'Yi>
sight and she '.Vas watching where she was going (Tr.
43, 50). Nothing occurred in the immediate area to
distract hrr attention as she began to walk from her car
to the bank (Tr. 51, ;52).
In attempting to described what had occurred, appellant testified she go.t out of the car, closed tlw door,
started to walk "and I fell owr something, hut I don't
know \Vhat it was" (Tr. 32). She did not know how rnam
steps she had taken. It might have been one stc>p or it
might have been more. She did not know which foot had
encountered an object that caused her to stumble and
admitted she did not know whether her foo.t "hit tlw
cement block or the pipe or some other object in the
area'' (Tr. 56). There was "a lot of grass around there"
and she did not know whether there was a rock "hidden
in the grass or weeds" that she might have stumbled
over (Tr. 56).
She admitted that in her deposition, taken H months
after the incident, and about 18 months before trial, slw
had testified that slw wasn't sure whether she had safe!Y
negotiated the curb

01·

not. Her state1mmt thrn is fonrnl

on pag-0 17 of the devosition, quoted at page 46 of this
record:
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"Well, I stepped on it and I don't know whether it was right on the curb or I stepped out to
step up on the cul"b, but I stepped out and then
I stepped up and brought my other foot forward
and then I went over and that's all I know and
all I can tell you."
Although appellant had read and signed her deposition, she had not corrected this statement. However, upon
trial, she claimed to be more sure of what occurred and
tl'stified she ·was "very much more sure" that she had
safoly reached the top of the curb and had not stumbled
over it (Tr. 47).
Appellant had no memory of what she had actually
dmw and she had gone back to the scene and had reconstructed what had occurred, as is shown by the following testimony which concluded her cross-examination:

"Q.

All right, now you went back and looked at
this area afterwards and then you have reasoned from that that you must have hit one
of these things that we've talked about; isn't
that true?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But so far as having an actual memory that
you can tell this jury and this judge, you
~an not say what happened; isn't that true,
an actual memory that you can actually call
on your mind, you can't tell us, can you 1

6
A.

No." (Tr. 47, 58.)

At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, the court
granted defense motions for involuntary dismissal, upon
the ground that plaintiff had shown no right to relief
as against any of the defendants.
Plaintiff filed a timely motion for new trial and
upon its denial, this appeal followed.

S'TAT'EMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE RESPONDENT, CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC
UTILITIES COMP ANY, IS NOT LIABLE FOR CONDITIONS EXISTING ON A PUBLIC HIGHWAY
WHICH IT DID NOT CREATE OR MAINTAIN FOR
ITS OWN BENEFIT.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S RECOVERY MUST BE
BASED UPON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.
POINT III.
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BECAUSE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, SHE WAS
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND
VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED A KNOWN RISK.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RESPONDENT,

CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC

UTILITIES COMPANY, IS NOT LIABLE FOR CONDITIONS EXISTING ON A PUBLIC HIGHWAY
WHICH IT DID NOT CREATE OR MAINTAIN FOR
ITS OWN BENEFIT.

The duties imposed by law for the maintenance and
eare of the sidewalk also apply to the parking strip between the sidewalk and the curib; the parking strip is
tr«atrd as part of the sidewalk for this purpose. Woodso11 r. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, 123 S.vV.
f\20 (Mo. 1909). The primary duty of maintaining the
siuewalk rests upon the City of Kanab. In Salt Lake
City v. Schubach, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d 149, 151-152
(rn-tG), this Court stated:
"'I'hat the city is charged with the duty of
maintaining the sidewalks within its limits in a
safo condition for use in the usual modes by
pedestrians thereon is so well established as to
need no citations of authority."

'rlie evidence in the instant case establishes that the
(·onerPtP hlock and the small pipe which the appellant
now holiews mio-ht
have caused her fall were located
0
11n public property located on the street side of the side\1-alk and owrnc'd hy Kanab Cit~- (Tr. 158-159, 160-161).
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The lia:bility for the condition of a public sidewall(
is imposed upon a private person only wlwn such person
creates the danger. In Basinger v. 8tandar.d Furniture
Co., 118 Utah 121, 220 P.2d 117, 119 (1950), this Comt
held:
"There exists no obligation on the part of
an abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining hi,
premises in repair, nor is he lablie for any statP
of disrepair. His ohligation can only arise. wherr
he creates through use or otherwise some unsafr
or dang-erous condition."
The evidence here demonstrates the fact that the cernPnt
hlock and the pipe located on the parking strip \dwre
the appellant fell were not constructed by respondrnt
Pacific but existed at the time of the lease. Moreover,
the removal of the pillars and canopy which exposed
the concrete block was undertaken solely by the respon
dents Bybee and vVatson, at the insistence of Kanali
City, without any participation by Pacific. The evidencf'
establishing these facts is found in the testmony of respondent Bybee, who testified he and \\T atson acquire<l
the large piece of property in 1955 and leased a portion
of it, on which the Pacific office \Vas located, in 19J9.
The canopy and pillars wer0 in plaC'e at the time of tlli'
l0ase hut tJwv WPI'P not part of the leased pro1wrty and
when thP city r0quested they be remov0d, the bnildiu~
ownPrs complied, without notieP to, cons<>nt hy, or par
ticivating paynwnt from, Pacific (J1:x. 7, Tr. 143, HJ,
1()1, 1G2).
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'1111 is evidence establishes that respondent Pacific
in no way created the alleged hazards, and thus, under
the holding of the Basinger case cannot be held responsible f 01 any injury caused by the presence of the objects
on thP parking strip.

In Solt Lake City v. Schubach, su.pra, the Court indirat(•<l another possible way that liability might shift
from a city to. a private person. Although such person
ma.\· not have created the hazardous condition on a public side,rnlk, he may still be subject to liability if he
lWPiVPs eontrol of the hazard and maintains it for his
h«nefit. 11 he Court clearly defined the circumstances
Tlf'ePssar.\T for such a shift of liability. The Schubach
r·nst• involved an action in indemnity by the city against
thl' property owner and the tenant to recover the amount
of a .iudgnwnt rendered against the city in favor of the
m.iun,rl party. The Court held the property owner liable
on the thPory of implied contract; he was allowed to con~:tnwt a sidewalk elevator, which added to the enjoyment
of l1is land. in consideration for his implied promise that
ltP \rnn1d properly co,nstruct and maintain it.
A pp lying the Schubach rule to the facts of the pres-

Pnt <·asp, it is clear that the o-vvner of the property, at
th(· timp tlu' canopy "·as constructed and the cement
l11~rn<blions and pillars were installed on city property,
:md1•ifoo'.~ the dnty of insuring they presented no un11 n:-:onnhle risk of harm to the pnhlic. The Court in
1111 .','17.1 ·r?1rrr71 rns 0 tlwn w0nt on to definr thr conditions
1
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under which this obligation could be transferred. "Only
by conveying the land, or by leasing it in entirety, ~~1
that the lessee is then in the shoes of the owner mav he
' .
escape liability." (Page 157) From this, it is seen that,
in this case, the obligation undertaken by the owner who
constructed the canopy passed to the respondf>nts LaMar
Bybee and O'Dell Watson when they purchased the prop(•rty. The obligation remained with them and cxistrd
at and after the time of the lease to Pacific in 1959.
The Court in the Sclmbach ease then went on to define the circumstances under whieh such an obligation
would pass to a lessee and a judgment in favor of tlw
city and against the tenant was reversed because thPn
\Vas no showing that the tenant specifically und('J'took
the obligation imposed on the owner who constructrrl
the sidewalk elevator, nor was there implied acceptancP
of the obligation, since there was no showing that thl'
tenant had control of the sidewalk elevator.
Applying the Schuu-ach decision to the present casP.
it is clear that the tenant in the instant case, respondt>nt
Pacific, did not have, nor did it undertakl', an;· obligation concerning sueh hazard as might exist by rE'ason or
the cPment blocks or the pipe on the public park\n1y:
it had no control

OYl'l'

that ground or the ohjects iw

b(•dded in it, nor did it agrPP to undPrtakE' any obliga
tion conf'erning them. In fart, thP respondPnts Dylw 1
and 'Wahwn sp('cifieall~- rdained control and an.v obli-
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gation ansmg therefrom. This is established by the
testimony of Mr. Bybee and by the terms of the lease.
The canopy and the land beneath it were not included
in the lf·ase; only the building, from the front wall where
the canopy began, to the rear wall, was leased to Pacific.
'!'he ]Pase excluded all surrounding property, as is shown
h>· the following description of the leased premisf"s:
"That certain building situated on the north
sidt> of Center StrPet in Kanab, Utah, on Lot 22
of Block 2, Kanab Townsite Survey, said building having a frontage of approximately 20 feet
and a depth of apprnximately 30 feet. Together
with the right to use the- existing driveway on the
wPst side of the building and with the right to
the use of parking and unloading space of approximately 30 square feet to the rear of said
building." (Ex. 7)
In this regard, the lessor and respondent, LaMar
BYlw0
.
' t<>stified upon cross-examination as follows:

"Q.

Mr. Bybee, the property that you are rentin bo- to California-Pacific is actually just a
building itself, is it not?

A.

That's right.

Q.

All rght. Now ... the front and south part
of the building that they rented stopped north
of the main side,rnlk line, isn't that true 1
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A.

That's true, yes.

Q.

And the area that we've been concerned with
here, the blocks and the pipe you say that
was adjacent to the blocks is south of there
of the property that California-Pacifir'
rented; isn't that right - south by several
feet?

A.

South.

Q.

Out towards the street in other wordsY

A.

Yes.

Q.

It's across the public sidewalk, south of your
property line and on public property?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And when the city gave notice to you and
the highway department to take out the canopy in the first place, you did that without
requiring California-Pacific to do any part
of it, isn't that true?

A.

That's right.

Q.

That was your affair, not theirs, isn't that
true? Yours as distinguished from California-Pacific~

A.

Yes.
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Q.

And they also had nothing to do with the
concrete blocks? They didn't take those out
did they?
'

A.

No.

Q.

You never gave them any notice to do that
did you?
'

A.

No, I did not (Tr. 160-162)."

rrhe testimony of Mr. Bybee further established that

he and \V atson owned the land immediately west, north
and east of the building leased to Pacific and that the
huilcling is therefore· "on front center of a bigger rectangular piece" they owned (Tr. 162).
Pacific, as lessee, unde·rtook no duty of maintaining
thp building. That obligation, by the terms of the lease,
remained with Bybee and Watson, as is shown by the
ninth clause of the lease:
"The lessors promise and agree to maintain
said building and premises at a reasonably good
state and condition at all times during the terms
of this lease." (Ex. 7)
Thr actions of the respective parties subsequent to
lhe lPasp illustrate thPir intent that Pacific should have
ahsolutely no control over the canopy and the concrete
hloelrn. The testimony from the record, as quoted above
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from pages 160-162, estabishes that the removal of thr
canopy and the later removal of the concrPte blocks wa~
accomplished without any consultation, notice or consent
hy Pacifir.
This Court in the SchitlJach case further held that an~
obligation in rPgard to the sidewalk elevator arose a~ a
(jllid pro qiw of the hPnefit confNred upon the owmr
hy its existPnCP. TherP is no evidence in the instaJ1t
rasf' that the canopy or the pipP in any way henditfrd
Pacific or was used hy it in its husinPss opPration.
'rhe removal of the canopy and pillars PXIJosed the
C'('ment blocks, which created a more dangerous con<l;tion than thP pillars, since the blocks were not as easil)ohsPrved. Further, the removal of tlw pillars madf:' access to the pipe f'asier, and thus increased the likelihood
of a pedestrian using the parking strip to trip owr the
pipe. The fact that the canopy and pillars were removed
at the rPquest of the city is a very significant fact.

In Otten v. Bi_q Lake Ice Company, 270 N.W. 13~
(Minn. 1936), an ice company was engaged in hauling
irP across thP highway to various dPlivery points in the
Hl"PU. rrhe COUTity desired to makP the highway safrr.
and paid th<· dt>frndant ic<:> compan~T to construct a tunnvl
nnd<>r the highway to nse in hauling· its ice. 'rhe plaintiff, while walking along tlw highway, f Pll into the f:'~w1 -

vation which cmnprisP<l part of tlw rompl<:>ted tunrll'l

lG
The court held that the ice company was not liable for
the dangerous condition created by the tunnel because
it \ms the county's project and they alone were liable
for the safety of thE> highways.
In Hlnck vs. Southern Pacific Cornpany, 12 P.2d 981
(Calif. 19:12), a city widened the street, but the railroad
rornpany failed to widen, to the same extent, the space
lwlwem its signal devices at a railroad crossing located
on the street. The plaintiff collided with a signal device
\1·l1ile traveling along the widened portion of the street.
'J'lte eourt held the railroad company was not liable for
tl1P injury since the condition was crf'ated by a project
0f' tlH• eit;.·, Pven though the injury involved a device
IH~longing to the railroad. The court stated:

"And while in the present case the co.ndition
in which the street was left after the improvemmts were made was likely to mislead travelers
as to the width of the crossing, this condition was
not created by the railroad company or upon its
property, and it was under no duty to warn of
tlte danger of deviating from the established crnssin;~·; nor as between the company and the plaintiffs was there any duty to fence its right of way
along the newly paved portion of the high"'ay."
(Page 98())

In tli<' pn•sent case, any danger that was created
\\'Ctc.: i11ci<1<·nt to a eity project, \\-a.s created at the request
uf 1lit• cit;.r, existed on property owned by the city, and
i 1111c- 11 ns tlw cit>·'s responsibility. It most cNtainly was
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not the responsibility of respondent Pacifir, which wa'
merely a tt>nant of a building on the otlwr side of tlw
public sidewalk.
Appellant cites Kanab City Revised Ordinances,
Sec. 18-1, in an attempt to persuade this Court to USP
it as a measure of the respondents' conduct. There are
several reasons why th!? ordinanrE' is inapplicable. to
respondent Parifi<:>.
First, the ordinance, by its terms, applies only to
one who places or permits the plaeement of the itrrns
mentioned. The testimony previously quoted establishP'
that Pacific did not place the pipe or cement blocks on
the parking, nor did it have control of the canopy

~n

as to 1wnnit their placement or removal.
Secondly, the ordinance applies only when the ikrn'
are placed on the sidewalk without the permission of thv
city. The ahove-quot0d testimony 0stablishes that tht'
exposure of the cement blocks was not only permitted,
but requestE>d hy the city.
Thirdly, it is usually held that sueh ordinances ar"
not to hP ust>d as a standard of rarP. Daly v. JJ!atth1'//'•,
122 P.2d 81(Calif.19-1-2); W. 1'. Grant Co. v. Casady, l~'

P.2d 8Sl (Colo. 19-1-8); Kinq v. J. Ji,'. GroslJie, 131 P~rl
105 (Okla. El-1-2).
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POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S RECOVERY MUST BE
BASED UPON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.

The facts necessary to the appellant's recove,ry are
not supported by solid evidence, but only upon speculation and conjecture. She does not know how far she
had walked when she fell; she may not have even been
in the vicinity of the block or the pipe. She does not
know what she fell over, whether it was a rock, a rut or
incline, a cement hlock, or the pipe or a combination of
these.
Tn addition to her testimony, quoted earlier in this
brief in the Statement of Facts, there are numerous
instances in the record indicating the uncertain and
speculative nature of appellant's evidence. For example,
she was shown a photograph of the area, Exhibit A,
and was then asked:

"Q.

And I presume you do not know where you
fell~

A.

No, I don't." (Tr. 43)

Although she had been uncertain of it upon deposition, appellant concluded at the trial that she had safely
iwgotiated the curb, but she did not know what happened
from that point, saying:
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" ... I stepped out onto the curb and tlwn J
stumbled over something, hut I don't know what
thing" (Tr.44).
Slw could not state at what point she stumbled aftpr
r losing- the ear door:

''Q.

But from there on out you don't knmv whetlwr
you took one step, or five steps from thP
car, or ho\\"ever many in hetwePn; isn't that
true1

A.

Right.

Q.

And you don't know whether it was your Mt
foot or your right foot or whatever it was
you did; isn't that true~

A.

Yes." (Tr. 57)

The possible alternative causes of the appellant's
fall have varying legal effects. If she tripped ovrr a
rock, there is no liability on the part of any of thP r~
spondents, O'K eefe v. Berry Co., 42 N.l'J. 2d 267 (Mas~.
1942); if sht> trippP<l ovf'r a rise or rut in the parkin.L'
strip, then the only possible liability ·would he upon th"
city, Rnsinqer v. Stnndrrrd Fur11it1we Co., su7Jrn.
Moreover, the placement of liability would var;.
depending on v\'ht>tlwr the appellant tripped over tlw
eprnent blocks or tlw JlipP, sine<> tlw pipt> in no way benl'
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t'ited the property to give rise to an obligation on the
part of the owner in favor of the city, under the ruling
in the Schubach case, whereas there may have been such
a benefit in regard to the canopy. However, in neither
rvent would there be responsibility upon Pacific, the
tenant here.
As a further indication of the speculative nature of
appellant's proof as against this respondent, there is
some C(Uestion as to whether the pipe (if that was what,
in fact, appellant stumbed over) was even located on the
land abutting the front of the building Pacific had leased.
TltC're is testimony indicating it was east of an extension
of the east wall of the building and, if so, it would have
lwun on land abutting the vacant lot owned by respondPnts Bybee and Watson (Tr. 146).
Court has held that in cases where there are
alternative theories of what caused an accident, and no
rational basis upon which to choose between them, so
that liability varies depending on the alternatives, recoypry must be denied. In the case of Tremelling v.
8011thern Pacific Co., 51 U. 189, 170 P. 80 (1917), ap1wal after remand, 70 U. 72, 257 P. 1066 (1927), the
~1 his

plaintiff's intestate was riding on a train as a brake!11an,

arnl was later found dead, lying next to a car on

an adjaernt track. His dE'ath had bE'en caused by a severe
'lrnll fracture. The plaintiff alleged that the skull frac(\ll'i,

was caused hy the deceased striking his head against
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a stPel car on the adjacent track, and that tlw car had
hePn negligently left in that position hy the defendanl.
The defendant contended that the plaintiff's allegation
was based on pure conjecture, that it was possihlr tha:
the deceas<>d's skull had been fracturPd by his falling and
striking tlw frozen ground. This Court held that H1
plaintiff must fail since tlwre was no rational ha~i'
npon which the jury could choose h<>tween the two alt~1natives. It said:
'' ... Tlw rule is well estahlislwd that wlwn·
an accident occurs through an alh~ged neglig«m1
of one person which rPsults in injury or dmnag1·
to another, and the injurPd person seeks to n·
cover damages, and it i.,; madP to appear that t]1,
accident mav have bPen occasionPd bv one of tw11
or sPvPral c~uses, and that the perso~ complainPd
of is responsible only for one of them, th<'n th 1
burden is on the plaintiff to show that the acciden1
and rPsulting damages ·were produced b)· the can,,
for which the person complained of is responsihk
and in rase of a failure to ~·stablish such a fact.
the plaintiff mnst fail in the action. In 29 Cyr'
Ci25, it is said: 'Th<> evidenet> must, however, rl 11
mor<' than mPrelv raise a eoniectnn~ or shmr '
proliahilit)· as to· tlw ca US<' of tlw injury, and 11 11
recowrv ean lw had if the evidmce lraws it t"
conjt>ch~re which of two probable eansrs r<'sulted
in tlH' injury, wlwrp dPfrndant was liahlr for onl
mw of thPn1.'" (170 P. at 8:::)
1

In t}w sarne

<'US<',

on appeal after n•mand, the Corn

quotP<l the aho,·<· stat<•rnPnt aµ:ain and add('d:
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"Respondent quotes from numerous adjudieated cases, all more or less in point, to the effect
that no legitimate inference can be drawn that an
accident happened in a certain way by simply
showing that it might have happened in that way,
without further showing that it could not reasonably have happened in any other way. Tested by
this rule plaintiff in the instant case failed to
riroYe defendant's liability for the accident." (257
P. at 1074.)
The doctrine of the Trernelling case was reaffinne<l
in Sumsion v. Streater-Srnith, Inc., 103 U. 44, 132 P.2d
r;so (19-t-:n, and Devine v. Cook, 3 U 2d 134, 279 P.2d
107~ ( 1955). Thus, appellant failed to establish a case
and thP trial court's ruling was correct because appellant
pn'sented possible alternative causes of her injury without any basis in the evidence to choose between one or
the other.
Tlit; appellant argues that an injured plaintiff may
go hark to the scene of the accident and there reconstruct

th(· \'VPnts and conclude how her injury occurred. HowC'YPr, it is difficult to see how, in this case, that would
in any way decrease the speculative nature of the cause
of tlw aJJpellant's injury. Since the appellant has no
icli->a of how far she walked before she fell or any recol1·(·ti(ln of tlw ohject over which she fell, there is no way
lo iw·onstrnct
1

the chain of events to permit even a cal-

ulatt>(l glwss as to the cause of her injury. If the

:lpJH·llant (10<'S not know how far she traveh~d before she

fell, admits the positive £>xistence of two ohj£>cts eitlwr
of which could have caused her fall, admits thP possihlP
existence of other objects often found on parking strip:-;
which could have caused her fall, it is impossible tr
determine, outside of pure speculation, the cause of lw1
fall.
Several eases are cited in support of app<>llant\
theory that she may return to the scene of the accid('nt
and speculate as to the cause of her fall. The appellant
first makes a general reference to the entire record of
th€' trial on remand in the case of Spencer 1 Salt Lak1
City, 17 U. 2d 362, 412 P. 2d 449. However, the record
<loes not support the appellant's argument. The r\•co.rd
establishes that the plaintiff in that case went back to
the scPne of the accident, but her visit was not to ascertain the cause of her fall. On the contrary, there is no
indication in the record that she was in doubt as to thtcause of her fall and, instead, there is affirmative evidence in the record that she ascertained the cause of
her fall at the time it occurred: "I don't remember seeing
any raised sidewalk until I tripped." (Emphasis added.)
1

(Record, Spencrr

'V,

•

Salt Lake City, p. 98.)

The appellant also cites Hunt v. Tooele City, 8 U. 2d
323, 334 P.2d 555, as supporting her argummt. However, after reading that opinion, this rPspondent

ha~

failed to find any support for the appdlant's argument.
r:l'lw ohjPet

OV<'l'

which tlw plaintiff fell in that

cHSl'

was ascertained at the time she fell, and there was absolutely no evidence nor was there even a hint that she
went back to the scene and made the determination.
Finally, the appellant cites Tom v. Days of '47, Inc.,
1G U. 2d 38G, 401 P.2d 946. This case likewise does not
support the appellant's argument. In the Tom case, there
was evidence, based upon expert testimony, upon which
tlw finder of fact could reasonhly exclude one of the
two alternative causes of the accident involved in that
cast>. There is no such evidence in the instant case.
POINT III.
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BECAUSE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, SHE WAS
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND
VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED A KNOWN RISK.

The judgment of the trial court should be upheld
because the appellant, as a matter of law, was guilty
of contributory negligence or voluntarily assumed a
known risk. The evidence estabishes that she was well
awan• of the existenct' of the cement block and the pipe,
t]1p objects which she now is sure she tripped over. She
1Pstifiecl as follows:
"(~.

A.

Mrs. 1\lcAllister, this
was it?
Yes, it was.

~was

clear, bright clay,
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Q.

And I suppose you had occasion to go to. tltP
bank many times in the years precPding this
accident, haven't you?
·

A.

Yes.

Q.

As I recall, I think you told us that the accident happened about 9 :15 in the morning?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you had seen those concrete blocks thrrP
lwfore, haven't you~

A.

YPs. (Tr. 43)

''Q.

And you knew the cement block was there.
You had seen that lots of times, hadn't you 1

A.

Yes.

Q.

And there was no reason you knew of why
you didn't see it. There's nothing to kePp yon
from sPeing it?

A.

No." (Tr. 50)

Despite the appPllant 's knowledge of the obstacles iu
the parking strip, she nevt'rtlwlt>ss chost~ to cross owl'
them instead of walking around them. FurtlwrrnorP, h('r
ey(:'sight was sn<'h that sht> admitted slw could "s<'e [WI'·
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fcdly well without glasses so far as walking is con1·Prnecl." (Tr. 50, lines 22-24.) There was nothing to
d1straet her attention as she crossed ovf'r tlwse known
dangPrs:

"Q.

"Was thf're anything in the street that distract<>d yon, Mrs. :McAllister?

A.

No.

Q.

Any nois0?

A.

Xo.

Q.

Any littlP kids running down thf' st red?

A.

Xo.

Q. And how ahout the sudden noise of an automobile horn, did you hear that?

A.

Xo.

Q.

Anybody yPll at you, \Yishing you good morning'?

.\.

X o, not that I lrnm\· of.

Q.

X ot a single r<'ason why you couldn't have
<·oneentrated on the business of walking from
your rar diagonall.v owr to the hank; is that
t l'll<' '!
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A.
Q.

Did you understand that quPstion?

A.

Q.

Is there anv reason vou know of now wll\·
you could ~ot have kept your attention o~
the husiness of getting from your car, out of
your car, across tlw area to thP door of tlw
hank?

A.

No.'' (Tr. 51-52)

Despite the appt•Ilant's ad('quate eyesight and tlw
absPnce of any distractions, she obviously was not watching out for tlw known dangers sine<:' she has no idea of
whPre she was in rplation to these dangers wh0n she
fell or whether she fell over these known dangers or
some other object.
In such circumstances, this Court has repeated!~·
found contributory negligence as a matter of law. Th··
casP of Colr 'l'. Klorpfrr, 123 U. 4:52, 2GO P.2d 518 ( 19:SJ ).

involves facts very similar to those in this case. rr'lw
defendant caused several large ce11wnt blocks to protrn<k
about thn•p inches ahovP thP snrfaee of the sidPwalk.
The plaintiff lived n<'ar th0 ar<>a w}wr<• this existed and.
having occasion frequently to pass over it, was "·"JI
awarP of' its existent'<'. ~ ev<>rtl1Pl<'~~s, th<• Jllainti f'f d10' 1

cross over the defect and was injured by tripping
ovPr tlw protruding cement blocks. It was held that since
tlH• accident occurred in hroad daylight and there was
nothing which substantially distracted her attention from
the known danger, she was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law.

10

1'lw Col(' case is even strongPr against appellant's
position because, in that case, plaintiff at least had
s011H' explanation for diverting her attention from ·where
~h<' was going whereas, here, as has been demonstrated,
thPre was ahsolutely no such element.
In the recPnt case of Tlli.r;htman v. BPttlyon's, Inc.,
1:> (T. 2d 200, 390 P.2d 120 (1964), the plaintiff 'vas injured ,,·hpn she> fell over vegetation which covered th<'
rnrfare of the sidewalk. 1'he court held that she was
lll'gligent as a matter of law since she was well aware
of tlH' existencP of the-w~eds over the sidewalk but neverthPl<>ss chose to encounter them.

In Wl1itm.rf'l1 ·u. TV. 1'. Grrrnt Co., 16 F. 2d 81, 395 P.2d
918 (1964), the Court statPd:
"Tl1P pla;ntiff is confront<'d with the basic
proposition that \vherP then• is a hazard whirh is
plainly visihh•, ordinarily one is charged with the
duh·
. of S<'eirw and avoiding it. And if he fails to
do so, it is concluded that lw was negligent either
in failin<r.~ to look ' or in failing-' to hped what
,....,
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h0 saw. . . . In order to just!(\- holding that a
jury question as to negligPnce exists, wherp injun
has resultPd from an ohsPrval1le hazard, it i·,
essential that tlwre be so11wthing which c.ould Jw
r<'garcled as tPncling to distract the plaintiff's ntt<>ntion or to prevPnt him from s0eing the dang(·r,
tlrns providing somp reasonable hasis for a firnling that <•ven though he exPrcisecl clue ear<>, lw
could lw PXCUS('d from sPeing and avoiding it.'·
(P. 920)
In EsPrni.a v. Ovcrla11d lllm.·ing Co., 115 U. 519, '..:!llli
P.2d 621 (1949), which \\TaR a case dissimilar on its farts
hut similar on principl0, this Court held that w]H'l'<' th1·
Pvidence shows that a plaintiff knows of a specific clang<>r, and has a chancP to avoid it, but choosPs not t11
avoid it, he is contributorily n0gligent as a matter of law.

l\f Ol'POVE'r, tlw fads of thiR CUSP establish that tlll'
ap1wllant voluntarily assumed a known risk and thm
her recovery should he barred. In Ferguson v. Jongsma,
10 P. 2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960), this Court statPd:
''Assumption of risl;: requirPs knmdPd!2,'<' b1
plaintiff of a speci fie d0f ect or dangProus condition causPd hy defendant's negligence or ]n('k of
dn<' can• whieh plaintiff could havP, hut volnntarilv and dPiiherat<>lv failPcl to avoid and tJipn•lJ\
assn~1wd th<• risk of tlw injuriPR lw sustained."

ThC' aetions of thP appellant in thP instant emw foil
pn•cisPly within thi;;.; <ldinition of assmnption of l'i:-:k.
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Tlw Court further stated that both assumption of
and contributory n<>glig(•nce follow as a matter of
law if:
ri~k

" ... the evidence was so conclusive on those
questions that a finding otherwisP would be unr<>asonable."

In Wold v. Ogden City, 123 U. 270, 258 P.2d 453
(1D;):3), the plaintiff was awan' of a large trench which
1•\isted in the street in front of his home. Nevertheless,
hr' voluntarily chosP a path over it and then straddled
'ii!' trench to help his wife over it. The sides of the
tr<'nch gave way, causing him to fall and sustain injury.
This Court affirmed a dismissal, entered after the open111µ; stat<'lllPnt by plaintiff's counsel, on the grounds that .
thP plaintiff "·as guilty of contributory negligence and
lw voluntarily assumed a knO\vn risk, both of whieh
WPre apparent as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Ti> hold respondent Pacific liable in this case would
hp thP <'quivalPnt of the imposition of strict liabiliity for
1·nnditions on public sidewalks and parking strips be1111·<·11 si<l<>walb~ and curbing. 'rlie creation of the instru111«ntalities that may have caused the appellant's fall
;1n1l !lit> alt<,rntion of th<>s<' instrummtaitiPs which made
tlt1·rn 111on' ha.7'ardons wPre solPly the work of the prior
• 11 q11'J'
of thP prop<'rt>· and of tlw othPr respond(>nts.
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Pacific was in no way invo.lved. Responsibility, if any,
should lie upon those who creatP the hazard, not upon
an unassociated third party.
The lower court's judgment should be affirmed herause the appellant did not sustain her burden of proof.
She attempts to leave the cause of her fall to speculation
and conjecture. The record contains no evidence upon
which a jury could properly ascertain the cause of her
fall and the possible alternatives vary the possible liability.
Regardless of possible alternative causes, appellant
should be barred from recovery against all respondent'
because the evidence· clearly establishes, as a matter of
law, that her own negligence contributed to her injury,
and she voluntarily assumed a known risk.
There was, therefore, ample basis for the trial court's
ruling and it should be affirmed.
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